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# CONTROVERSY
More on the Bakke Decision:
From Robert M. O'Neil, Kenneth S. Tollett, David E. Feller
and William Van Alstyne

Robert M. O'Neil: In his perceptive essay, Professor
Van Alstyne ("A Preliminary Report on the Bakke
Case/' AAUP Bulletin, 64 (December, 1978), pp. 286297) has gone well beyond the initial level of analysis
of the Bakke opinions. What he has done, in fact, is to

pursue the implications for some considerable distance. That process of extrapolation is made vastly
more difficult by the number and the variance of the

Three issues merit further comment here. First,
Professor Van Alstyne seems uneasy about the defer-

ence which Justice Powell pays to the admissions
process in general and more specifically to the commitment to "diversity" through that process. I must
confess to some of the same uneasiness, although I
may be more inclined than he to be grateful even for

small favors. Given the grudging recognition by the

opinions. As he observes at several points, a defec-

courts of academic freedom as an element of first

tion by any of the four Justices comprising either the
Stevens or the Brennan block could not only alter the

amendment protection, one would not have expected
to find the admissions process suddenly accorded
such stature. Although Justice Powell does not really
tell us, presumably both thé .adoption and the appli-

result, but could also divert the course of the developing law. Yet the Court deserves some sympathy
for reasons that are partly obvious and partly not;
despite the public excitement over the issue of preferential use of race, Bakke is for the Supreme Court
truly a case of first impression. For this reason, as

cation of admissions policies can now claim pro-

tection comparable to that afforded the statements of

faculty members and the political organizations of
students. The claim to be made for including admis-

well as the intrinsic difficulty of the constitutional is-

sions decisions within academic freedom id a rather

sues, our natural desire (and need) for clear answers
should be tempered with a measure of understanding
and patience. Surely the%Court might have done bet-

subtle and intriguing one- a claim that one would

ter - and there is evidence in the opinions that a
higher degree of consensus was once achieved but
lost later ht the spring. Yet there is also much helpful

guidance in the opinions, and questions which have
been so troubling since 1970 can now begin to be resolved.

ROBERT M. O'NEIL is Vice President and Professor of Law
at Indiana University, Bloomington, KENNETH S. TOLLET
is Distinguished Professor of Higher Education in and Director of the Institute for the Study of Educational Policy, Howard

University. DAVID E. FELLER is Professor of Law at the
University of California, Berkeley. WILLIAM VAN AL-

STYNE is Professor of Law at Duke University.

have expected to be made and accepted at a later
time in a case more directly presenting the issue.
After the initial surprise that the argument was so
readily received when it was not essential to do sosurely Justice Powell could have validated "diversity" as a university interest on other grounds - it
seems to me one should express relief rather than
anxiety, and get on about the business of seeking
new territories to conquer. At the same time, however, the casual acceptance of the academic freedom
claim in Justice Powell's opinion could raise doubts
about the scope of academic freedom in other dimensions of university life to which it is more central. These issues remain for later cases, and for the
moment we should take heart that so significant a
feature of higher education has at least received a
well-deserved measure of recognition and protection.
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There is another kind of uneasiness, however.

More explicit is Professor .Van Alstyne's doubt

clear plea that race-conscious remedies should be
considered "transitional," and should last only as

whether diversity - however desirable it may be as a
matter of academic policy - is truly a "compelling"
interest. Justice Powell says that only such interests

long as the catalytic conditions persist. There is also
the insistence of the Brennan group that programs

will suffice to sustain race-conscious programs,

crimination - thus implying serious doubts about favoritism for groups (e.g., Vietnamese, Cubans) who
may indeed be underrepresented but have not been
victims of past racial discrimination in this country.
One must also take seriously the Brennan caveat that
programs must not be stigmatizing; while the Davis
program may well survive this test, special remedial
tracks and surely anything like differential grading
policies would get few if any votes from the Brennan
group. (In fact, the Brennan group seems stricter on
the "stigma" issue than Justice Powell; programs designed to achieve "diversity" might well win his approval even if the beneficiaries were in some measure
stigmatized.)
The point is that the Brennan opinion, despite its
rather casual acceptance of a dual standard for racial
classifications, is qualified in other ways. One could
well infer that the Davis program represents its outer
limit, and that any extension of its race-conscious

whether designed to help or to hurt minorities - a
single standard which has much wisdom. Yet he does
not offer any formula for determining when an inter-

est is "compelling" - nor, for that matter, did the
Court offer any such formula even when they were
more in accord on such matters as miscegenation
laws and welfare restrictions, both of which required

proof of a compelling governmental interest. The
failure is not simply one of definition but, as Van Al-

styne suggests, goes deeper. One cannot imagine that
Justice Powell would uphold a race-conscious program to reduce the minority enrollment - to bring in
more whites from other states to replace local blacks,

for example - simply because "diversity" was asserted as the rationale, and a logical connection between purpose and means could be proved. Thus,

despite his rejection of the "double standard"

adopted by the Brennan group, there is more than a
hint that Justice Powell has in fact condoned a
double standard of his own. Evidence of that lapse
appears not only in the "diversity" section, but in the

discussion of other possible reasons for using race for example, the desire to meet the medical needs of
"underserved areas" through special programs. (It is
hard to believe that Justice Powell would uphold a
program to force minority medical students or grad-

uates to serve in rural or ghetto areas at lower incomes simply to achieve the laudable goal of improving the distribution of medical manpower. Thus the
interest that may well be "compelling" when minorities are helped may be vulnerable when it underlies
a classification harmful to minorities).
If Professor Van Alstyrte is justifiably critical of the

for minorities must be addressed to "societal" dis-

elements (for example, by admitting the sixteen
"Task Force" students directly rather than going
back through the general admissions committee)
might lose the vote of at least one Justice.
It is for this reason that I would take minor issue
with one other part of Professor Van Alstyne's analy-

sis: the suggestion that plans factually very close or
even identical to the one before the Court might be
sustained under slightly different circumstances. He
offers as one example a program not subject to the
provisions of Title VI - something of a rarity given
the extent to which federal funds pervade those insti-

tutions which maintain highly desirable and therefore selective programs. (Even on the private campus,

though federal funds may not be withdrawn from

Powell opinion, it seems to me he may be a bit harsh
on the Brennan group. While the adoption of a dual

any but the offending unit, there is a persuasive argument that racial discrimination is forbidden in all

standard for racial classifications is troublesome - the

areas of university life by the receipt of federal fund-

more so because it makes de jure what remains at
most de facto in the Powell opinion - not all the dire
predictions necessarily follow. Toward the end of the

essay, we are warned that four Justices have validated a "theory of racial quotas and racial double
standards quite sufficient to fuel a generation or
more of ethnic politics under a new order which will
consciously distribute opportunity in this country by
explicit racial percentages and specific ethnic classifi-

cations" (p. 297). Surely the Brennan group is not
monolithic. There is, for example, Justice Blackmun's

ing for any purpose). Moreover, this conclusion
would follow only in the unlikely event that one
member of the Stevens group were to reach the constitutional issue and decide it as the Brennan group
did. It seems more likely that the members of the
Stevens group would have some trouble even with
Justice Powell's position on a factually similar case,
much less with the Brennan position. The possibility
of a majority of five votes to uphold anything that
closely resembles the Davis program seems remote
and elusive. It would be far safer if those who are
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concerned with admissions policies took as their
starting point the clear invalidity of the Davis program, and went on from there. Whether or not one
calls this program a quota is unimportant, as Justice
Powell wisely cautioned. What is important is that

The basic message should be clear. The Supreme
Court did not ban all use of race in the admissions

process, though they did ban one particularly heavyhanded preferential program. The responsibility of
persons who shape higher education policy - beyond

five Justices found the dual-track admissions system

as well as within colleges and universities - is to

to be racially exclusionary (albeit on different

adapt as best we can to changing, though clearer,
constitutional conditions. A person of good will and
conscience cannot find in the Bakke opinions any

grounds). The negative import of the decision is as
significant as the positive implication that race may
be used under different conditions. The quest for alternatives will be aided by an early and unequivocal
rejection of the Davis model. Many other options,
which are both fairer and more sophisticated, exist
and should be tried by institutions which genuinely
seek to expand educational opportunity in constitutionally valid ways.

basis for relaxation of affirmative action or equal op-

portunity programs. Indeed, the fact that some may
now find an excuse for temporizing or even withdrawing makes a renewed commitment on the part
of others even more urgent. There is much work yet

to be done, and no shortage of imaginative responses.

Kenneth S. Tollett: Professor Van Alstyne's preliminary report on the Bakke case is most subtle, illuminating, and insightful. I have little quarrel with his
summary of the case except for his characterization
of the regular admissions program at Davis as select-

Professor Van Alstyne accurately and fairly, indeed
subtly, analyzes the case, he nevertheless tilts the
reader's mind in a negative direction toward the special admissions program by stating the question so
that it resonates philosophically in opposition to the

ing from "the best" of the applicants in con-

Brown decision. Moreover, his characterizing the
fundamental notion of Anglo-American jurisprudence of remedying wrongs as "the amortization of
the national racial debt" says something about his

tradistinction to the special admissions program, pre-

sumably not selecting from among the best. In this

connection, Justice Blackmun's opinion deserved

more attention from Professor Van Alstyne. Justice
Blackmun recognized that "the selection process inevitably results in the denial of admission to many

sensitivity to the pervasive and vicious mistreatment
of blacks and some other oppressed minority groups.

making arena where there are competing contestants,

Major Supreme Court decisions like Bakke have always had different levels of meaning and implication. Lawyers and some other individuals who conscientiously want to be governed by what the Court
decides will comb through such opinions with clear

the values and goals of the game or the enterprise
should be decisive in determining who will win or

some plausible meaning or interpretation of the deci-

qualified persons, indeed to far more than the number

of those who are granted admission." It is most important at the outset to recognize that in a decision-

lose. Thus, to the extent that the mission of the university includes ethnip diversity and the redress of soci-

etal discrimination, "the best" necessarily embraces

some of those in the special admissions program.
I have one other principal reservation or objection
to Professor Van Alstyne's descriptive characterization of the case. He states that the question the
Court decided "was whether racially separate and
unequal admissions standards are . . . constitutionally condemned." I would prefer to restate the question: whether a racially sensitive admissions program
which seeks to insure diversity and redress societal
discrimination is constitutional. This difference in

characterization, I believe, has considerable influence
on how one will react to the decision. Thus, although

and different perspectives or biases and develop
sion. If one has very high expectations regarding the
reservoir of decency and rationality of the Supreme
Court and this society, such an individual, notwithstanding his positive perspective toward affirmative
action, may find very much that is disturbing in the
opinion, particularly if he is familiar with the sorry

history of the United States Supreme Court. Of
course, there is another level which may be more
symbolic and provocative than anything else, but
probably, in political decisions like this, is the most
important. One may ask simplistically who won and
who lost the case? I fear that this kind of simplistic
popular analysis of the Bakke decision may in the
long run be the most decisive and disturbing aspect
of the case. Certainly, to Professor Van Alstyne's
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credit, he has not given a simplistic analysis of the
opinion.
Whatever one may say about the special admissions program at the Davis Medical School of the
University of California, it unquestionably was designed to bring more minorities into thé medical pro-

fession, including blacks. An assault on the special
minority admissions program at Davis was inevitably
and inescapably an assault upon bringing more mi-

nority groups into medical schools and thus into
higher education. Although some may have been sincerely motivated by the notion of racial neutrality in

supporting Bakke in his case, an unavoidable outcome of such an assault was to undermine the legitimacy and, in some minds, the desirability of making
special efforts to educate blacks and other minority

However, he rejected the Davis method of considering race because although " 'the race of an applicant may tip the balance,' the factor of race in contributing to diversity may not be decisive." Back in
Oklahoma we would characterize such language as
"speaking with forked tongue."
Professor Van Alstyne fairly and correctly states
that Justice Brennan in his concurring and dissenting
opinion, in which three other Justices joined, thought
government may take race into account when it does
not demean or insult any race and was designed to
remedy disadvantages cast on a race by past racial
prejudices or discrimination. Justice Brennan thought
the legacy of slavery and the turning of the Equal

Protection Clause "against those whom it was in-

tended to set free" in the separate-but-equal doctrine

groups. One cannot now fully foresee the con-

justified taking race into account in the admissions

sequences of the Bakke decision, although it can im-

process.

mediately be seen that it was partially reassuring for

Justice Powell in announcing the judgment of the
Court to state that race may be taken into account in

the admissions process. (It is significant to note that
although medical school enrollment is up, the black

In rejecting the argument that Title VI of the 1964

Civil Rights Act required color blindness, he wrote:
It is inconceivable that Congress intended to encourage

total is down. The Association of American Medical

voluntary efforts to eliminate the evil of racial discrimination while at the same time forbidding the voluntary use of

Colleges has recently released findings that reveal

statutory violations.

that the number of blacks in the nation's medical

schools declined this year despite an increase in
overall medical school enrollment, and the proportion of blacks in the first-year medical class is now
the lowest it has been since 1970.)
It was disappointing for Justice Powell to write that

the special minority admissions program could not
be justified upon the basis of "remedying . . . the effects of 'societal discrimination/ " a concept of injury

he found "amorphous" and that might be "ageless in
its reach into the past."
So much has been written and said about Justice
Powell's opinion - with the main substantive arguments of which no other Justice indicated agreement - that I will say little more about it. (To Profes-

sor Van Alstyne's further credit, he did give
considerable attention to Justice Brennan's opinion in

his postscript.) Justice Powell regarded the use of
race or ethnic background in the admissions process
as suspect and rejected three of the four purposes the

program purported to serve. The three rejected purposes were reducing the historic underrepresentation
of minorities in medical schools and the professions,
remedying the effects of societal discrimination, and
increasing the number of physicians who practice in
underserved communities. The fourth purpose he accepted, namely, "obtaining the educational benefits
that flow from an ethnically diverse student body."

race-conscious remedies to cure acknowledged or obvious

Thus, since the racial classification in the Davis program served an important and articulated purpose,
did not stigmatize or single out any group "least well
represented in the political process to bear the brunt

of a benign program," and sought to remedy the effects of societal discrimination which resulted in a

substantial and chronic underrepresentation of minorities in medical schools, access to which was impeded by the handicaps of past discrimination, it did
not violate the Constitution. After reviewing prior
relevant cases of the Court, Justice Brennan concluded:

Properly construed, therefore, our prior cases unequivocally show that a state government may adopt race-conscious programs if the purpose of such programs is to re-

move the disparate racial impact its actions might

otherwise have and if there is reason to believe that the

disparate impact is itself the product of past discrimination, whether its own or that of society at large. There is no

question that Davis' program is valid under this test.

I have quoted at length from Justice Brennan's opinion because I think undue attention has still been

given to Justice Powell's opinion.
A discussion of the Bakke case from a perspective
favorable to affirmative action and special minority
admissions programs should give more attention to
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Justice Blackmun's and Justice Marshall's opinions.
At the very outset I alluded to Justice Blackmun's
forthright recognition of how the admissions process

actually operates in selective admissions programs.
Two other quotations from Justice Blackmun's opinion I think are worthy of special attention in a journal directed primarily at university professors. He
wrote further about the admissions process:
It is somewhat ironic to have us so deeply disturbed over a

program where race is an element of consciousness, and
yet to be aware of the fact, as we are, that institutions of
higher learning, albeit more on the undergraduate than the
graduate level, have given conceded preference up to a
point to those possessed of athletic skills, to the children of
alumni, to the affluent who may bestow their largess on the
institutions, and to those having connections with celebrities, the famous, and the powerful.

And finally, with almost an existentialist's appreciation for the starkly subtle paradox, he concludes:

class-based discrimination against Negroes, the Court is
unwilling to hold that a class-based remedy for that discrimination is permissible. In declining to so hold, today's
judgment ignores the fact that for several hundred years
Negroes have been discriminated against, not as individuals, but rather solely because of the color of their skins. It
is unnecessary in twentieth century America to have individual Negroes demonstrate that they have been victims of
racial discrimination; the racism of our society has been so

pervasive that none, regardless of wealth or position, has
managed to escape its impact. The experience of Negroes
in America has been different in kind, not just in degree,
from that of other ethnic groups. It is not merely the history of slavery alone but also that a whole people were
marked as inferior by the law. And that mark has endured.
The dream of America as the great melting pot has not
been realized for the Negro; because of his skin color he
never even made it into the pot.
The Bakke decision was unstable and in certain re-

spects indecisive. Surely any university sincerely
committed to affirmative action and special minority

I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affirmative action program in a racially neutral way and have it
successful. To ask that this be so is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat
some persons equally, we must treat them differently. We
cannot - we dare not - let the Equal Protection Clause perpetrate racial supremacy.

admissions programs has little reason on the basis of
the Bakke case to discontinue such programs. Yet one
wonders why affirmative action and special minority
admissions programs have caused so much trouble in
academe; for as Paul Jablow has recently written, "If
integration was to work at any place in society, it

In the discussions of the Bakke case, very little attention has been given to Justice Marshall except that

Marshall gives in his review of the status of blacks in

a few commentators have called his opinion emotional, although eloquent. Justice Marshall, in his
opinion, catalogues in stark terms the history of unequal treatment afforded to blacks and its relationship to our present circumstances. He recites statis-

tics that set forth the difference between blacks and
whites which should shock the conscience of all de-

cent human beings. However I am sure most readers
of Academe know about the shorter life expectancy of

blacks, the high infant mortality rate of blacks, the
difference in family incorrie and unemployment rates

and the gross underrepresentation of blacks in the
various high-status trades and professions. If one is
familiar with those statistics, one approaches this
case from a different perspective. Instead of quoting
Marshall's poignant recital of those statistics, I would
like to quote at length from another part of his opin-

ion. He writes the following about the Court's judgment:

should have worked in the faculties in America's col-

leges and universities." One of the statistics Justice
this country is that they make up "2.6 per cent of the

college and university professors."
It is a melancholy fact to reflect upon that once the

principles and procedures of affirmative action explicitly were made applicable to higher education,
the most sustained, insidious, and probably effective
assault on affirmative action came from those closely
associated with academe. I am not insensitive to the

real problems and difficulties imposed upon those
who, even conscientiously and sympathetically, try
to abide by the procedural and substantive requirements of affirmative action. The problems and diffi-

culties are small in comparison to the wrongs that
have been committed and the social benefits to be re-

ceived by those who have been excluded and denied
for so long.

Although the immediate result of the Bakke case
may be to leave things in a vague muddling state, no
one can doubt the depth of the philosophical conflicts involved. It appears that the Supreme Court is

While I applaud the judgment of the Court that a university may consider race in its admissions process, it is more

reflecting the mood of the majority of white Americans that the interests of that majority are being dis-

than a little ironic that, after several hundred years of

placed by affirmative efforts towards equality and
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justice. Unable to find solutions to the short-term ex-

Commission Report and Recommendations in The

aggerated problems facing the country, the negative
reaction of the people seems to have spread to the

Purposes and the Performances of Higher Education in

learned men and women in academe whom we look

to for counsel on the larger questions of justice.
I believe Professor Van Alstyne is correct when he
states that Justice Powell shows considerable deference to universities in accepting as a legitimate
purpose of admissions programs the attaining of racial or ethnic diversity. One can argue that this is a
value peculiar to academe and deference may appropriately be given to it. Although I take a somewhat

purist view regarding the missions and goals of
higher educational institutions, yet believe racial div-

ersity is a legitimate educational goal, I am more
comfortable with institutions taking race into account to remedy societal discrimination. At least I
think the Equal Protection Clause and the Constitu-

the United States: "The enlargement of educational
justice for the postsecondary age group." The Commission further recommended regarding this purpose:

A determined effort to provide places in college for young
persons who wish to attend from low-income and minority
groups, with adequate financial assistance for their support
and with respect for their cultural backgrounds.
A greater concern for the opportunities available to the total postsecondary age group, and for the total contribution

of postsecondary education to the achievement of social
justice. [P.4]

Finally, unlike Professor Van Alstyne, I emphatically
agree with Justice Blackmun that in order to get

tion clearly permit that, in a way I am not sure they

beyond racism, we must first take account of race. It

necessarily condone racial diversity as an expression
of academic freedom. Moreover, I subscribe to the

Alstyne's obvious good will, good intentions, and

is remarkable to me that a person of Professor Van

third purpose of higher education in the Carnegie

high intelligence, could think the contrary.

David E. Feller: Bill Van Alstyne's otherwise superb
description of what the Supreme Court did in Bakke
(as opposed to what the newspapers and magazines

though not in identical language, of Mr. Justice Powell and the Brennan four on the proposition that Title

have reported that it did) omits a few, but important,
elements.

The most important is that he fails to note, let
alone emphasize, the most significant fact about the

case: that there was, indeed, an opinion of "the
Court," binding as precedent, as distinguished from
separate opinions which agree only on the judgment
and which are, in ,no sense, the law. That opinion

This utterance (along with the conclusion, al-

VI proscribes only those racial classifications that
would violate the Constitution) is a decision of "the
Court" and, hence, authoritative. Nothing else is. Institutionally the court is as free to decide subsequent
cases as if all the other language of the opinion did
not exist.

That language may, of course, be helpful in speculating as to how the individual members of the Court

consists of just two sentences, separately paragraphed for this purpose, in the Powell opinion

will vote in subsequent cases, as are comments made
in oral argument or prior statements by newly ap-

which were explicitly concurred in by the four Justices who joined in the Brennan opinion. Those two
sentences are the only authoritative statements of
law in the Bakke case. They read as follows:

pointed Justices; but it is important for others to distinguish, as the Justices themselves do, between pro-

In enjoining petitioner from ever considering the race of
any applicant, however, the Courts below failed to recognize that the State has a substantial interest that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions
program involving the competitive consideration of race
and ethnic origin. For this reason, so much of the California court's judgment as enjoins petitioner from any consideration of the race of any applicant must be reversed.

nouncements concurred in by a majority of the
Justices and individual opinions which support the
result reached but not the reasoning.
The second comment concerns not an omission

but an addition. Van Alstyne says that the four Justices in the Stevens group interpreted Title VI of the

Civil Rights Act "as a flat prohibition of any school
which receives federal assistance from employing
more rigorous admissions standards under which are
excluded some students who might otherwise have
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been admitted but for the reservation of places for
students judged by more permissive standards solely
because of their race" (p. 287). They didn't. Nor did
they say that "separate and unequal admission policies ... are ... forbidden." They did say that Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act prohibited exclusion on the
basis of race. And it is undoubtedly tempting, since
they also concluded that Allan Bakke had been excluded on the basis of his race, to insert into their
opinion the words which Van Alstyne does as to the
use of differing or separate admission standards to
accomplish this exclusion. But, tempting though it

four Justices who joined in the Stevens opinion
would support a private right of action. The Stevens
four said that it would; Powell and the Brennan four
said that even if it would it would make no differ-

ence, since Title VI embodied only the constitutional

restriction. Hence there was no majority for the
proposition that there is a private right of action under Title VI, and Mr. Justice White - although agree-

opinion as to "whether race can ever be used as a

ing with the substantive result of the Brennan opinion - specifically noted his view that it would not.
The question is currently pending before the Court
in connection with the identical provisions relating to
sex discrimination in Title IX, Cannon v. University of
Chicago, certiorari granted July 3, 1978 (five days after Bakke). If a majority should now hold that Title IX
(and hence Title VI) provides no basis for a private

Constitution or under Title VI.

then, in any Bakke recurrence, be obliged to reach the

be, it is improper to attempt to fill the interstices of
the Stevens opinion in this way, since the opinion ex-

pressly says that it does not purport to express any
factor in an admissions decision" either under the

All that we know from the Stevens opinion, and
clearly all that the Stevens opinion is intended to tell

us, is that in the view of those four Justices Bakke

was excluded from the University because of his
race. They carefully, and I believe deliberately, refrained from telling us what characteristic of the
Davis program it is that leads to this conclusion. We
therefore do not, and cannot, know what variant on
the Davis program would, in their view, pass muster
under Title VI. My own guess is that this elision is
the result of a disagreement among the four as to the

reasoning by which the conclusion was reached that

was suppressed in order to have an opinion supported by the same number of Justices as joined the
Brennan opinion and thus prevent that opinion from
being the "lead" opinion. The objective was achieved
by omitting any reasoning and inserting the blunt
statement that the opinion is not to be regarded in
any way as a statement of views as to the propriety
under Title VI, let alone the Constitution, of the use
of race in the admissions process. The result is that
we have four Justices* who say that race can be used
as it was at Davis, one Justice who says that race can
be used, although not in the way that Davis used it,
and four Justices who express no opinion on that
question, either under Title VI or under the Constitution, other than the bald and unexplained state-

ment that it was used to exclude Bakke in violation
of Title VI.

Once we start to speculate, as Van Alstyne quite

properly does, as to what this collection of in-

determinacies means for future litigation, there is another unknown which he omitted. One of the issues

argued by the parties, at the Court's request, was
whether the provision of Title VI relied upon by the

action, the members of the Stevens group would
constitutional question and one or more of them may
very well join the Brennan four, as Van Alstyne notes.
The possibility that the occasion for such a decision will
arise as a result of a holding that Title VI does not support a private right of action is at least as large, in my
view, as the probability that this result will occur be-

cause those four will regard themselves as bound by
the majority decision in Bakke that Title VI imposes no
greater restrictions than the Constitution.
Finally, as to the descriptive portion of the article, I
believe that some mention should be made of the

fact that Powell appended to his opinion the Harvard
College statement as to its admissions program and
explicitly endorsed it as constitutionally permissible.
The Harvard program, as set forth in the appendix to

the opinion, says explicitly that attention is paid to
numbers in awarding "plus" points based on race.
Obviously, if the purpose of the "plus" is diversity
there is some point at which it is achieved, i.e., a
maximum. And Harvard says that, although there is
no firm minimum, "it would not make sense" to admit as few as 1 per cent or 2 per cent blacks. Surely
Mr. Justice Brennan is correct in saying that it can

make no constitutional difference whether the num-

ber used in a special admissions program is openly
stated or kept within the confines of the room in
which admissions decisions are made. We are there-

fore entitled to conclude from Mr. Justice Powell's
explicit approval of the Harvard program that an admissions program involving consideration of race
and ethnic origin is not to be condemned as improperly devised, to use the Court's words, if it includes
consideration of the number of persons who will be

admitted on the basis of considerations of race.

Nor, analytically, would it seem to make any dif-
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ference if the desired number of minority admissions

is achieved by assigning a "plus" based on race to
some of the competitors or by reserving a number of

places for which nonminority applicants are ineli-

gible. Powell's opinion would apparently require
Davis, for example, to say to the 100 students who
would have been admitted there in the absence of its

special admissions programs that each is entitled to
compete for all of the places, but he would permit
Davis to award "plus" points to their minority competitors so designed that the result of the individual
competition he requires would be some number, let

us say ten, of minority admissions. The Brennan
group, on the other hand, would permit the outright
reservation of ten places for minority applicants. But

the difference between a 90 per cent chance at 100

seats and a 100 per cent chance at 90 seats seems
only to be that in the former case the imperfection in

the calculation of the "plus" as applied to successive
classes may lead to less precise results.
In essence, then, the difference between the Powell
view and that of the Brennan four is not the differ-

jections to the requirement of ambiguity which he
raises to constitutional dimension. It thrusts upon
educators the dubious task of engaging in double
talk in order to justify consideration of race. Apparently, however, the Justice - as well as the distinguished institutions which urged this course of ac-

tion1 - believed that the political advantages of
vagueness and imprecision were worth the cost.
There remains, of course, a second and possibly
substantive reason why Powell did not regard the
Davis program as "properly devised" while the Brennan group did. Powell justifies distinctions based on
race only on diversity grounds and would therefore,
at least implicitly, require that factors other than race

be used in providing "plus" points (or their negative
equivalent, handicaps). The Brennan four would not.
On the other hand, the Brennan view justifies the use
of differential standards as a "remedial measure" to
counter the effects of past discrimination against the

preferred groups, and thus limits their permissible
use to those situations. Powell would impose no such
limitation: any distinction in the name of diversity

ence between a one-track and a dual or triple-track
system, for a one-track system with "plus" points
can produce no more or less inequality than a mul-

will apparently do. The difference may be part of the

tiple-track system without them. Or, to put the mat-

you are drawing others, as well. I put this aside how-

ter in Van Alstyne's words, the result in either case
"is necessarily to displace certain persons from positions . . . they would otherwise have filled but for
which they are now rendered ineligible ..." (p. 295).

ever (and, as well, the latitude which the Powell view

obfuscatory design of the Powell opinion: the racial
line is not really so clear if you draw others, or say

would at least appear to provide for distinctions
based on religion, political affiliation, or other attrib-

all sure that there are not genuine advantages to the

utes that could possibly be said to contribute to diversity) in order to confront directly Van Alstyne's
postscript addressed to the Brennan position.
Van Alstyne characterizes the Brennan justification (and, hence, limitation) as a system of "racial
transfer payments" to amortize the racial national
debt and says that those of the majority chosen to
pay are the least likely to be those who benefited
from the prior injustice. On this basis he concludes

former. Nor do I believe that Mr. Justice Powell is so

that if the Davis program can thus be justified it is in-

obtuse as not to have understood exactly what he
was doing. The Court was faced with an apparently

complete. Why not a preference in all things: jobs,
government contracts, faculty positions, even space

The differences between the Powell and the Bren-

nan views as to the requirements of a properly devised admissions program involving consideration of
race are essentially two. First, as indicated, the Powell prescription seems to require secrecy and vagueness while Brennan would permit openness and precision. As a lawyer I prefer the latter, but I am not at

unbridgeable gap between two positions, behind
both of which large social forces had been marshalled, and the potential of a political explosion if
either position were explicitly sustained. The option
of simply refusing to hear the case was foreclosed
because the California Court had come down firmly
on one side. The mootness "out" was not available.

Hence, he elected a solution which essentially said to
the professional schools of America that they could
continue, with one possible exception, to do pretty
much what they were doing provided they disguised
it a little. There are both principled and practical ob-

in professional journals. Why not, I might add to this

parade, lower income tax rates for blacks than for
whites, thus - given a progressive rate structure - as-

sessing most heavily those who have benefited most

from the presumed past discrimination against

blacks?

The answer, it seems to me, is that Van Alstyne
has forgotten that the Bakke case involved education,

'Columbia, Harvard, Stanford, and the University of
Pennsylvania.
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not the awarding of prizes or money. The state's pur-

pose in providing professional schools is not to give
rewards to the most deserving, or to provide a payoff

for the best, but to provide training. Concededly,
those trained do receive a benefit and, given the virtual guarantee of high earnings which graduation
from medical school confers, it is perhaps understandable that the system for allocating the available
positions in medical schools therefore be seen as a
system of allocating rewards.
Understandable, but wrong. That those admitted
to school receive a benefit is an incident to a system
primarily designed to select those whose education
will best serve society's purposes, not to give benefits

to the most "deserving." Thus, in the medical school
context, preference for an applicant who comes from
and who is likely to return to a rural area over an ur-

ban applicant does not signify that the city dwellers
owe a debt to the farmers which is being amortized
or that the rural applicant is in any sense more deserving. Equally, the suggestion made by many, and
hinted at in the Powell opinion, that the purposes of

ure of minorities to present the same level of qualifications as white applicants is due to the effect of past

discrimination is incomplete if it does not also perr
mit, or indeed require, that all other public benefits
be allocated on a racial basis. What was involved in
Bakke was the allocation of educational resources to

serve the objective of providing society with at least
some minority doctors. Preferential treatment in the

admissions process was required in order to achieve
this objective because there was room for only a tiny

proportion of those fully qualified for the training
and past discrimination differentially affected the cri-

teria by which those to be trained were chosen. The
use of racial preference to balance the effect of past
discrimination in order to achieve the desired product mix need imply nothing as to the use of race as a

measure of just deserts.
I fully recognize that it is improper to draw gener-

alizations from one or two particular cases. But since

Van Alstyne has chosen to use Allan Bakke's personal background to illustrate the problem he sees in
the Brennan position, it is perhaps appropriate to

special admissions programs can be served more

conclude in the same vein. Allan Bakke, he says,

constitutionally by providing special pre-medicalschool training for minority applicants in order to

came from a working class family: his father was a
postman. My point (and Brennan's) as to the lingering effect of past discrimination is made if we add

better prepare them for an admissions process that is
run without regard to race is nonsense: if it is unconstitutional to prefer minority applicants at the seven-

teenth year of the educational process, it is equally

unconstitutional at the sixteenth or at the first. If a

law school may not constitutionally set aside places
for minority applicants, CLEO cannot constitutionally provide special prelaw training for minority
would-be applicants.

that Bakke's home environment included a mother

who had received a bachelor's degree from the University of Minnesota at a time when the number of
blacks enrolled there, if any, must have been minuscule, and that he himself graduated from Coral

Gables High School in Dade County, Florida, a

school which no black could have attended because

"complete actual segregation of the races, both as to

For the same reasons Van Alystyne's inference

teachers and pupils, still prevailed ..." (Gibson v.

from the Brennan position does not follow. He says

Board of Public Instruction of Dade County, Florida,
272 F.2d 763, 766 CA 5 1959).

that the not unreasonable Brennan view that the fail-

William Van Alstyne: Professors Tollett and Feller
chide me for what seemed to them an unduly negative description of the question in the Bakke case.

restate the question" suggests Professor Tollett:
whether a racially sensitive admissions program which
seeks to insure diversity and redress societal discrimina-

That description was, as the reader may recall:

tion is constitutional.

"whether racially separate and unequal admissions
standards are constitutionally condemned." In con-

In elaborating the reason why this matter of prelimi-

trast, Professor Tollett chose a very different formu-

nary description is by no means trivial, Professor

Tollett went on to observe:

lation which, incidentally, is nearly the same as the
manner the Regents also chose to describe the ques-

This difference in characterization, I believe, has consid-

tion in their Supreme Court Brief. "I would prefer to

erable influence on how one will react to the decision.
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Thus, although Professor Van Alstyne accurately and
fairly, indeed subtly, analyzes the case, he nevertheless
tilts the reader's mind in a negative direction toward the
special admissions program by stating the question so that
it resonates philosophically in opposition to the Brown decision.

different from my objection to its use in behalf of
causes we may think to be despicable: its intellectual
vice is that it literally leaves no room at all to stand
against its sheer complacency.

Suppose that the case we had been considering
were not Bakke, in 1978, but rather a close likeness of

He is quite right. How one phrases a question, any
question, does indeed "tilt the mind." His own preferred description most assuredly does this no less

Plessy v. Ferguson, in 1896. Suppose, that is, it were a

than mine. Which, then, is better? Is it true that each
is no less instructive than the other, and that the true

schools. I should have thought it reasonable to state
the question in that case, equivalent to the dry and

difference between them lies only in the supportive
or in the hostile frame of mind of the author? I do not

think that that suggestion exhausts the possibilities at

all. I am very grateful for the chance to say why I
found the manner in which the Regents characterized
the question in Bakke entirely inappropriate and alto-

gether too smug.
One may explain the Davis Medical School admissions system, or any system, in any number of ways.

Before undertaking to do so, however, it may nonetheless be useful first to touch its most elementary
features, to concede what they are, and thus to understand why some sort of explanation seems to be

case just then contemporary involving the review of

a state statute requiring racially separate public

noncommittal form I used for Bakke, pretty much as

follows:

Whether state statutes requiring racially separate public
schools are constitutionally condemned.

But a reasonably parallel form of putting the question according to the rhetoric of maximum positive
description (like that of the Regents in Bakke) would
have been something more like this:
Whether a racially sensitive school assignment policy

which seeks to minimize the occasions for racial friction

and to assure a historically disadvantaged minority an
equal opportunity to develop its own course free from

called for. The Davis admissions standards were ra-

domination in schools in which its culture would become

cially unequal. The Davis admission processes were
racially separate. Indeed, were it not for these fea-

submerged and its children likely to be overwhelmed by a
racial majority which has for two centuries presumed to
oppress it, is constitutional.

Whether these circumstances are unavoidable as a

This question is self-answering: a governmental plan

tures, no constitutional question would arise.

means of providing diversity is important, no doubt,

insofar as that may tend to provide some reason for

an arrangement that must otherwise be thought
highly improper. Whether these circumstances are
unavoidable to redress societal discrimination is, at
best, also a matter which, if true, may give appropri-

ate pause to thoughtful persons before concluding
that the arrangement should, despite its appearance
of impropriety, not be constitutionally condemned.
None of us, however, 4does any genuine professional
service whatever to the difficulty of the ensuing issues by ^glossing over the very elements of the plan
which are the essence of the controversy.
At one time, I also saw the question very much in
the argumentative style in which the Regents presumed to present it, i.e., the style of maximum posi-

tive description. But I have privately tested that approach by letting it be used equivalently in other
cases, discovering that it works only too well with

equally devastating effect to "tilt the mind" too
much. It induces a congenial acquiescence precisely
when the academic mind needs encouragement to be
critical instead. Indeed, my objection to its use in behalf of causes we may deem to be wholly just is no

accomplishing so much good (and the question as
formulated acknowledges no other possibility) must
assuredly be constitutional. And so, indeed, might
one rewrite Plessy v. Ferguson even now.
If it is true that my description of the basic question in Bakke was more jarring to the sensibilities of
readers than seemed either necessary or even in good

taste, it is because I have looked back at the consequences of sharing the congeniality of more "sensi-

tive" and less adversarial descriptions of what we
have done before and found within them a disastrous

courtesy. The state is called upon to account for what

it does. We do no cause any good to proceed differently about the matter in Bakke than we should have

done in Plessy (but, in Plessy, as only the dissenting
Justice Harlan presumed to do).

As to the other comments on my brief paper, I have
too little to say that could possibly be convincing to
those not already sharing my misgivings about the
basic issue. That issue is the constitutional licitness

in the government's use of race, now deployed to re-
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quire less of some persons than of others, on the

this or in any similar fashion, and I remain apprehen-

basis that this is a necessary and proper way to

sive of an accordionlike fourteenth amendment that

"help" them and yet communicate no intimation of
stigma. I am admittedly doubtful that we shall "get
beyond racism" by "first taking account of race" in

appears to provide no repose against the perpetual
temptation to submit racial classifications to the vicissitudes of politics in this country.
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